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antee of freedom of speech are involved. Many state statutes previously
thought to come within the guidelines established by Chaplinsky must now be
reconsidered.
Paul D. Smith
How To Avoid the Supreme Court Voiding
Your Attempt To Avoid Probate
Two years before her death, Virginia Miller executed two trust instruments
describing parcels of land she held as trustee for her nephew, Arthur Huckaby.
Miller was unmarried, and, therefore, there was no community property inter-
est in the property. In these instruments, Miller reserved extensive powers
over the trust corpus, including powers to (1) revoke or amend the trust,
(2) enjoy income during her lifetime, (3) encumber the property with
liens or mortgages, and (4) sell or otherwise alienate the corpus, all without
the necessity of consent by the beneficiary. Miller designated Huckaby as her
successor trustee, empowering him to administer the trust if she became in-
capacitated and to transfer legal title to himself as beneficiary when she died.
At Miller's death, Westerfeld, her administrator, brought suit in an attempt
to recover the parcels of land for her estate, alleging that the trusts were
illusory and testamentary and, therefore, invalid. Both the trial court and the
court of civil appeals upheld the trusts.1 Held, affirmed: Retention by the
settlor of powers to revoke and to invade the corpus, and the right to receive
a beneficial life interest in a trust composed of non-community funds does
not render that trust illusory or testamentary. Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 474
S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971).
I. THE TESTAMENTARY TRUST AND ILLUSORY TRUST DOCTRINES
The Testamentary Trust Problem. One of the main uses of a revocable inter
vivos trust has been to avoid the necessity of executing and probating a will.'
Courts have, however, traditionally attempted to limit this use.' In large part,
this judicial impulse results from the existence in every jurisdiction of statutes
regulating the formal execution of wills.4 These statutes are designed to im-
'Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 462 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1970).
2 See, e.g., Berall, Inter Vivos Trusts Are Still Excellent Estate Planning Tools, Despite
Recent Changes, 36 J. TAXATION 258 (1972); Budner, Some Basic Reasons for the Use of
Trusts, 110 TRUsTs & EsTATEs 346 (1971); Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will,
78 U. PA. L. REv. 626 (1930).
'See, e.g., Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 A. 139 (1939);
Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N.E 716 (1925); Kelley v. Snow,
185 Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904); Stone v. Hackett, 78 Mass. 228 (1858).
"Requirements vary from state to state but usually include some or all of the following:
(1) expressions or evidence of testamentary intent; (2) subscription by the testator; (3)
witnessing of the testator's signature by two or three witnesses; and (4) publication by
the testator. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (West 1956); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-204
(1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 55 (1970). Holographic wills and nuncupative wills are
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press upon the testator the solemnity of his act, protect him from undue
external influence, and provide evidence of his testamentary intention after
his death.5 The testamentary trust problem arises because a trust in which a
settlor retains all important indicia of ownership of the trust corpus during
life, and causes transfer of those indicia to a designated person at death is, in
effect, a will. Such an instrument was regarded as invalid under the traditional
view because it failed to comply with testamentary execution requirements.!
In 1935 the Restatement of Trusts reflected this traditional view by deeming
all trusts in which the settlor had reserved extensive control to be testamentary
in so far as they were to take effect after the settlor's death.' The implied
rationale was that by reserving such extensive control over the trust, the settlor,
in effect, made the trustee his agent and gave up no real interest in the trust
until death.'
After the 1935 Restatement, however, an increasingly large number of
courts began to regard the testamentary use of trusts more favorably. Some
of these courts avoided the testamentary problem by holding that the passage
of any recognizable present interest to the beneficiary or trustee could prevent
the trust from being strictly testamentary in nature. This was the case even
though the settlor reserved vast powers to revoke and control the trust.9 This
shift in judicial opinion is reflected by the 1959 Restatement of Trusts, which
permits the settlor not only to control the trust's administration, but also to
reserve powers to revoke and modify the trust without creating a testamentary
disposition." The great weight of authority follows the 1959 Restatement in
upholding the validity of such trusts."
sometimes permitted but are subject to different requirements. See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 60 (1956).
' These functions are known, respectively, as the ceremonial, the protective, and the
evidentiary functions. There is substantial doubt, however, as to whether they are effectively
carried out by the formal requirements of will execution statutes, and whether the harm
of imposing formal requirements that invalidate numerous transactions exceeds their benefit.
See, e.g., E. SCOLES & E. HALLBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 96 (1965); Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
'See, e.g., Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229 (1883); Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass. 491,
100 N.E. 637 (1913); McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N.E.
465 (1909); Darling v. Mattoon State Bank, 189 Wis. 117, 207 N.W. 254 (1926);
Warsco v. Oshkosh Say. & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924).7 
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 57(2) (1935).
'Id. See also Peterson v. Weiner, 71 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934),
error ref.
'See United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946), in
which the settlor retained the powers to sell, assign, and transfer the corpus, revoke the
trust at will, and the right to enjoy a life estate. The court held the trust valid, reasoning
there was a present transfer of interest to the beneficiary as evidenced by the trust instru-
ment. This present interest was revocable, however, by the exercise of the enumerated powers
by the settlor. See also Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942).
An even more liberal application of this present-transfer-of-interest test as applied to
a trustee occurred in Farkas v. Williams, 5 I1. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955). In this
case the settlor, in addition to making himself trustee, retained powers to revoke the trust,
to enjoy a beneficial life estate, and to invade the corpus. The court, however, refused to
hold that this extensive reservation of rights during the settlor's lifetime rendered the trust
testamentary. It reasoned that since the settlor held these powers in his capacity as trustee
and not as settlor, that he had in fact made a present transfer of interest. The court did not
consider it significant that the settlor transferred this interest to himself.
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959).
11G. BOGART, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 104, at 536 (2d ed. 1965); 1 A. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 57.1-57.2 (3d ed. 1967). See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d
647 (9th Cit. 1961); Nickson v. Filtrol Corp., 262 A.2d 267 (Del. Ch. 1970); Rose v.
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The Illusory Trust Problem. Although the illusory trust doctrine frequently
arises in connection with the testamentary trust doctrine, and is almost as
frequently confused with that doctrine," the illusory trust doctrine is a result
of an entirely separate problem. It is a response to the attempted use of the
trust concept in ways that frustrate statutory provisions for financial protection
of the family at death." The illusory trust doctrine is best illustrated by the
early case of Newman v. Dore."4 In this case the settlor created a trust in
which he retained complete control over the trustee, power to revoke the
trust, enjoyment of income during his life, and power to invade corpus. Upon
his death, legal title to the corpus vested in named beneficiaries outside his
family. The settlor's express purpose in creating this trust was to avoid the
New York law which provided a share of the husband's estate upon his death
to his wife." New York had passed this forced share law in order to provide
an adequate portion of the matrimonial property for the widow and children,
even if the decedent had attempted to disinherit them by will. " Noting this
statutory purpose, the court conceded that the settlor could effectively diminish
his estate by gifts or other bona fide transfers of his property during his life-
time. He could not do so, however, in frustration of the statute by a transfer
that was less than an actual "good faith" divestiture of ownership. 7 Based on
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 99 Ill. App. 2d 81, 241 N.E.2d 16, aff'd, 43 I11. 2d 312, 253
N.E.2d 417 (1968). Some jurisdictions even sanction the revocable inter vivos trust as a
will substitute by statute and thus avoid the uncertainty of whether such a trust is valid.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-1-5 to -9 (1972); Wis. STAT. § 231.205(1) (1957).
"2Compare the following definitions: "[11f . . . the husband retains the power of
revocation, it is fallacious, illusive, and deceiving, and will be considered a fraud on the
rights of the widow where she is deprived of her distributive share." Ackers v. First Nat'l
Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840, 851 (1963). "[S]uch [illusory) trusts may not be
used as a device to deprive the widow of her distributive share of the property possessed by
her husband at the time of his death." Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58
N.E.2d 381, 390 (1944).
A third doctrine, which is also often misinterpreted, is that of the "colorable" trust.
This designation is applied when a settlor executes a seemingly valid trust but secretly
agrees with the trustee that he or she as settlor may continue to control the trust. Holmes
v. Mims, 1 I11. 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953); Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 62 A.
507 (1905). As an example of how the colorable trust doctrine has been misinterpreted,
one court has held that it "means merely that the conveyance or gift must be one legally
binding on the settlor or donor, accomplished in his lifetime, and not testamentary in its
effect." Kerwin v. Donaghy, 137 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (1945).
"See Bell, Community Property Trusts-Challenges By the Non-Participating Spouse, 22
BAYLOR L. REV. 311 (1970); Comment, Land v. Marshall--The Illusory Trust Comes to
Texas, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 408 (1968); Comment, The Illusory Trust and Community
Property: A New Twist to an Old Tale, 22 Sw. L.J. 447 (1968).
4275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). Earlier decisions declaring such a trust illusory
were decided on the basis of whether the settlor had the intent to defraud his or her spouse
at the time the trust was created. Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930);
Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 A. 14 (1891). Some states provide for an "intent-
to-defraud" test by statutory codification. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.150 (1956),
which invalidates all transfers "in fraud of the marital rights of [a) surviving spouse."
15N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 18 (McKinney 1930), as amended, N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
§ 18 (McKinney 1966).
'"See ch. 229, § 20, [1929] N.Y. Laws 519, in which the New York legislature de-
clared that its intention in enacting the Decedent Estate Law was "to increase the share of
a surviving spouse, either in a case of intestacy or by an election against the terms of the
will of the deceased spouse thus enlarging property rights of such surviving spouse .... "
'7 The test has been formulated in different ways, but in most jurisdictions the
test applied is essentially the test of whether the husband has in good faith
divested himself of ownership of his property or has made an illusory trans-
fer. 'The "good faith" required of the donor or settlor in making a valid
disposition of his property during life does not refer to the purpose to affect
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this reasoning, the court labelled the trust "illusory," held it invalid, and
returned the corpus to the estate so that the wife could get her full statutory
share.
Newman v. Dore has been followed not only in New York, but also in
numerous cases in other jurisdictions throughout the country.'" In spite of this
widespread use of the illusory trust doctrine, its first significant application to
a trust that attempted frustration of community property interests occurred
in the recent Texas case of Land v. Marshall.' The settlor had created a trust
funded with community property. He had reserved a life income with exten-
sive powers over the trust corpus. In addition, he had directed that a life
interest should go to his wife upon his death, and the corpus to other named
beneficiaries. Citing Newman v. Dore, the Texas Supreme Court held this
trust illusory and, therefore, invalid. Even though the husband had the power
of management and control over the property and the right to alienate it by
a bona fide transfer,"0 he did not have the right under Texas law to dispose of
the wife's community property by will."' Thus, the court concluded that the
surviving spouse could demand that any inter vivos trust having the effect of
decreasing the deceased spouse's estate must have contained some genuine
present transfer of interest.
II. WESTERFELD v. HUCKABY
In Westerfeld v. Huckaby the Supreme Court of Texas began its opinion
by restricting the illusory trust doctrine as set forth in Land v. Marshall to
cases in which the trust corpus is composed of community funds. Westerfeld
made clear that the Land trust failed not because the settlor retained too much
control over his own share of the trust property, but because he frustrated his
spouse's marital property interests. The court pointed out that the illusory
his wife, but to the intent to divest himself of the ownership of the prop-
erty . .. '
9 N.E.2d at 969.
18See, e.g., Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 I1. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944);
Ackers v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840 (1963); Van Devere v. Moore,
242 Minn. 289, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954); Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 209
(1941); Rouston v. Hovis, 60 Ohio App. 536, 22 N.E.2d 209 (1938). Much confusion,
however, followed the Newman v. Dore decision, of which the Ohio situation is illustrative.
Prior to 1961, Ohio case law was clearly in line with Newman v. Dore. See Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944). In Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961), the court expressly overruled Bolles, relying
heavily on precedent established by Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d
627 (1938). White, however, concerned a testamentary trust problem and had nothing to
do with marital property rights.
"9426 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968); ci. Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 66 (1857), and Crain
v. Crain, 17 Tex. 81 (1856), in which parents' attempts to transfer their property and
thus circumvent an heirship statute giving shares of the parents' estates at death to their
children were struck down as being illusory transfers.
'When the Land case was decided in 1968, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4619
(1960) permitted the husband sole management and control over all community property.
This article was repealed in 1969. As of 1969, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.22 (1972)
permitted each spouse to have management and control over the community property he
or she brings into the marriage.
21See, e.g., Langehennig v. Hohmann, 139 Tex. 452, 163 S.W.2d 402 (1942); Dakan
v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935). The surviving spouse in this situation
may elect to rake either under the will, or one-half the community property. Wright v.
Wright, 153 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83
S.W.2d 620 (1935).
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trust doctrine did not directly invalidate the portion of the Land trust com-
posed of the husband's property. The transfer of the wife's property, however,
was illusory. Such an illusory transfer defeated the purpose of the trust and,
therefore, invalidated the entire trust.
Since the issue was not involved in Westerfeld, the court never expressly
dealt with the reason behind permitting one spouse to have management and
control over the community property during life,2 and not have similar con-
trol in directing its disbursement at death. A probable explanation is that in
the inter vivos management of community property, one spouse will be
restrained from pauperizing the other by large disbursements because such
property also provides for his own needs. In contemplation of death, however,
mutual benefit is no longer a factor.
The main thrust of the court's opinion dealt with the possible testamentary
nature of the Westerfeld trust. The court first recognized that Texas statu-
tory law has taken a very liberal stance as to how much power a settlor may
retain without having his trust declared testamentary. A settlor under the
Texas Trust Act not only may revoke a trust at will,' but also may appoint
himself trustee and thus exercise complete control over the administration of
the trust.' In keeping with the spirit of the Texas Trust Act, the court stated
that it considered the 1959 Restatement of Trusts' to represent the correct
trend of the law. The court even hinted it might go as far as upholding any
"inter vivos trust no matter how extensive the powers over the administration
by the settlor."'
To support its conclusions, the court looked to the trust instruments them-
selves. In both declarations, Miller had used the word "hereby" in the sentence
"I hereby nominate as successory trustee, Arthur Huckaby." "Hereby," accord-
ing to the court, was a word which signified that whatever act or event it
modified was accomplished at the time the word was used. It further signified
that the act was a result of some prior act or event. Thus, the court reasoned,
if Miller had intended to appoint a successor trustee when she made the
declarations, it must have been a result of her intending to create a trust that
would be operative at the time the trust declaration was made. The court
found indications of present intent to create an inter vivos trust in the pro-
vision for Huckaby, as successor trustee, to administer Miller's beneficial life
estate should she ever become unable to manage her own affairs. According to
the court, this could only indicate that the settlor contemplated her trust
would be a living, useful instrument at the time of its creation.
The court did not discuss the desirability of having formal requirements
such as those for wills"7 for the essentially testamentary Westerfeld trust. In-
stead, it emphasized the advantages this type of trust could offer a person
planning an estate. The court pointed out, for example, that such a trust
22 See note 20 supra.
21TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-41 (1960).
"Id. art. 7425b-7.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959).
25474 S.W.2d at 271, quoting from 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.2 (3d ed.
1967).27See note 2 supra, and acompanying text.
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permits appointment, without time-consuming court proceedings, of a person
who the settlor has confidence will manage the trust and provide a regular in-
come should the settlor become physically or mentally incapacitated.' The
court also recognized that the lag between the death of a testator and the
probating of the will can be lengthy. 9 During this time, a small business can
fail, and property interests can become seriously jeopardized by lack of proper
management. The inter vivos trust, with a provision for disbursement of the
corpus at the settlor's death, provides a relatively simple solution to this
problem.
Although the court did not expressly so state, it appears a significant dis-
satisfaction with the present probate system is behind the court's approbation
of the practical advantages of the Westerfeld trust."0 It is even possible that
such a dissatisfaction was the moving force behind the entire opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
Westerfeld was the first confrontation of the Texas Supreme Court with
the problem of a trust funded with non-community property in which the
settlor had retained extensive powers of control over the corpus. The distinction
the opinion makes between applying the illusory trust doctrine solely to trusts
composed of community funds and the testamentary trust doctrine solely to
trusts composed of non-community funds is a valid one. First, the distinction
is supported by an impressive line of legal authority, beginning with Newman
v. Dore. Second, each doctrine has a different rationale. The illusory trust
doctrine is based on the public policy of protecting the rights of a spouse
in community property, while the testamentary trust doctrine rests on the
questionable necessity of preventing a settlor from circumventing the formali-
ties of the wills statutes. Thus, each doctrine should be attacked, supported, and
understood in light of its own separate rationale.
The reasoning of the opinion itself, however, is open to criticism. The
heavy emphasis on the technical aspects of the language of the trust declara-
tion in construing it as a presently operative instrument weakens the applica-
bility of the opinion to future cases in which such language is not employed.
Instead of rejecting the testamentary trust doctrine outright, which is the im-
port of the opinion, the court preferred to find a present interest in the trust
even though its effect was overwhelmingly testamentary. As a result, it will
be interesting to see if the Texas courts continue to strain to find a presently
2 See, e.g., Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust (With Emphasis on
Use as Will Substitute), 37 DICTA 333 (1960); Miller, Advantages Available to Client and
Counsel from Use of Inter Vivos and Testamentary Trusts, 29 TEx. B.J. 1019 (1966);
Roth, Estate Planning in Florida: The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, 16 U. FLA. L. REV.
34, 34-35 (1962).
*"Professor Atkinson estimates that 13 to 14 months are required as a minimum time
period for settling an estate. T. ATKINSON, WILLS 575 (2d ed. 1953). See Bostick, The
Revocable Trust: A Means of Avoiding Probate in the Small Estate, 21 U. FLA. L. REV.
44 (1968).
"0 In expressing this dissatisfaction the court is not alone. See, e.g., Bostick, supra note
29; Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code, Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 453 (1969); Wellman, The Lawyer's Stake in Probate Reforms, 47 MICH. ST. B.J.
No. 3, Mar. 1968, at 10. Non-legal criticism of probate proceedings has also been prolific
in recent years. See, e.g., N. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE (1965).
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